American Diplomatic Records Regarding German Public Opinion
American Diplomatic Records Regarding German Public Opinion During the Nazi Regime
Source : Richard Breitman , International conference: German Society's Responses to Nazi Anti-Jewish Policy 1933-1941, Yad Vashem, 10-13 February 1995.
Despite the quantity and importance of Nazi official reports on German public attitudes, there is no way to derive a representative sample of the population from them 1 . As a result historians have turned to non-Nazi sources to enhance our picture of the German public under the Nazi regime. The extensive data compiled by the Socialist underground and smuggled abroad ( Sopade Reports), represent one major source of nonofficial evidence of German public attitudes. Reports by foreigners in Germany provide another valuable perspective and, occasionally, a source of detailed information on changes in German public attitudes during the 1930s.
Foreign diplomats, responsible for sending accurate information to their governments, represent a special category of foreign observers - at their best, providing running and expert observations of changes in the political and social climate over time.
To be sure, not all foreign diplomats had an interest in the Jewish question. Moreover, many diplomats lacked sufficient contact or familiarity with German society to make observations of significant historical value (or of immediate use to their governments). But American diplomatic records and private correspondence by some American consular officials stationed in Germany offer some corroboration of other sources on German public opinion, as well as some insights into the strength of German antisemitism during the years 1933-39.
All reports sent by Embassy and Consular officials to the State Department (and correspondence from Washington to the field), are available in the Central Decimal File in Record Group 59 of the United States National Archives branch in College Park, Maryland. American officials in Germany, as elsewhere, gathered much more information than they actually sent to Washington. These original records (often called post records) of the Embassy and consulates were supposed to have reached Record Group 8 of the National Archives. Although some original records of the American consulates in Germany survive, most of what was of political significance was apparently sent to Berlin, where a fire during World War II gutted the collection. So we are left largely with the materials sent to Washington, supplemented by private papers.
In theory, American Embassy officials had charge of political reporting, while the consulates specialised in economic analysis, promotion and protection of American interests and citizens, and a range of other matters such as issuance of visas. In actuality, the distinctions between the American diplomatic service and the consular service had begun to break down, which was an advantage in the case of Germany 2 . Key consular officials in Germany consistently provided more detailed and more valuable political reports than their Embassy counterparts.
The Embassy in Berlin lacked strong direction. American Ambassador to Germany Frederick H. Sackett, Jr. resigned before the March 1933 inauguration of President Roosevelt, and his successor, former history professor William E. Dodd, did not arrive at his post until July 1933. Although admirably anti-Nazi, Dodd lacked diplomatic experience and self-confidence and failed to develop good contacts within German society, let alone among Nazi officials during 1933-37 3 .
Dodd's successor at the start of 1938 was Hugh Wilson, who decided that a softer line against Nazism might be less confrontational. Wilson was recalled after Kristallnacht 4 , and there was no American ambassador in Germany during the nine months preceding the outbreak of war. An early counsellor at the Embassy (and chargé d'affaires during the Gleichschaltung ) was George A. Gordon, who was snobbish and weak 5 .
Meanwhile, Consul General George S. Messersmith had served in Berlin since 1930 and was fluent in German, having been raised in a middle-class Pennsylvania Dutch family where German was a second language 6 . Messersmith also had an extremely talented subordinate and protege in Consul (later consul general) Raymond H. Geist, a Harvard Ph.D. who also spoke German fluently and quickly became the most valuable American representative in Berlin 7 . He eventually became not only consul general, but also first secretary in the embassy. Geist's contacts within the German government and Nazi movement made it possible for American lawyer George Rublee to negotiate with Germany on behalf of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees in early 1939 8 .
In my research for this article I looked at a broad array of American diplomatic and consular reporting. Since Messersmith and Geist provided the most detailed and consistent accounts, I have focused on them here. A broader account would not, I believe, significantly alter the conclusions drawn from Messersmith's and Geist's views.
Almost from the beginning of the Nazi regime Messersmith began to supply Washington with lengthy reports of dramatic and not so dramatic events. Not for nothing did he have the nickname "forty-page George.ΓÇ¥ 9 In a manner that must have occasionally infuriated his busy superiors, but which benefited historians later, Messersmith relayed very detailed information about the antisemitic movement in Germany, as well as his own interpretation and analysis. Messersmith also took to writing lengthy personal letters to Jay Pierrepont Moffat, who headed the European division in the State Department, and Under Secretary of State William Phillips. When Messersmith left Berlin to take up the post of American minister in Vienna in 1934, his interest in the changes in Germany persisted and he continued to write about them.
Geist followed his example in writing dispatches and letters, although in better prose and not to the same length. Geist also corresponded with Messersmith, especially after the latter became Assistant Secretary of State in 1937. The result is two continuous series of reports from perceptive and involved observers in Germany, both of whom paid considerable attention to the evolving Nazi policies toward Jews and both of whom deplored them. Messersmith provided early warning (in August 1933!) that the Nazi regime was working on, and intended to issue a law stripping German Jews of their citizenship, and that it wanted eventually to eliminate Jews from German life 10 . In a letter to Under Secretary of State William Phillips, who was himself a social antisemite, Messersmith did not gloss over the political and moral problem of Nazi antisemitism:
'There has been nothing in social history more implacable, more heartless and more devastating than the present policy in Germany against the Jews. We cannot permit the public statements in Germany... and the propaganda which is being carried on abroad by the Germans to blind us to the real facts...' 11 .
Phillips spoke to President Roosevelt about this letter and sent him a copy 12 .
Initially Messersmith viewed the Nazi leaders as having infused antisemitism into their followers over a number of years, promising them benefits from the take over of power and the forthcoming actions against Jews. Thus, the party and SS members, according to Messersmith, represented a force for radicalism on the Jewish question 13 . He wanted to believe that the party leaders were more moderate and opportunistic. He soon came to recognise, at least as far as Hitler and Goebbels were concerned, that the appearance of moderation was a complete illusion. It was only the realisation that antisemitic actions could injure Germany's interests that exerted a check on the regime's actions against Jews 14 . Geist was even more pessimistic (and more accurate), in his appraisal of Hitler and other party officials. In late 1935 Geist regarded Himmler as probably the second most powerful individual in the Nazi regime after Hitler; he also forecast a German move eastward in about two years. Geist sensed that in spite of divisions bmoderates and radicals on the Jewish question, Hitler would align with the radical camp, which would win out in the end. In December 1938 Geist urged a major new American effort to save larger numbers of German Jews who were "condemned to death.ΓÇ¥ 15 Toward the end of his tenure, in April 1939, Geist warned that once the efforts of the Intergovernmental Committee yielded limited results, the Nazi leaders would proceed to solve the Jewish question in their own way:
'It will, of course, consist in placing all the able-bodied Jews in work camps, confiscating the wealth of the entire Jewish population, isolating them, and putting additional pressure on the whole community, and getting rid of as many as they can by force' 16 .
Both Messersmith and Geist observed with surprising accuracy what was happening within the regime in the area of anti-Jewish policy.
Given their track record, their views of German public opinion are of considerable interest. Both men initially distinguished sharply between the Nazi movement and the German public. Messersmith believed that Nazi actions against Jews in the professions and in business, were not acceptable to the majority of the German people 17 . The reason, however, was not moral principle, but rather a distaste for Nazi methods combined with concern about the practical effects. Messersmith reported that the boycott of 1 April 1933 was not popular with the German public, because it damaged both the economy and Germany's image abroad. At the same time, many Germans came to accept Nazi propaganda that the boycott was necessary to convince foreign countries to stop their own "boycottsΓÇ¥ and propaganda against Germany. Messersmith included a detailed memorandum written by one of two American vice consuls who had toured Berlin on 1 April, reporting that many Germans had treated the boycott as a joke and had continued to shop at their favourite stores 18 . Messersmith also sent a very detailed summary of a private conversation with Hermann Bucher, head of the huge electrical power concern AEG, who was under pressure to dismiss those of his department heads who were Jewish.
'Dr.Bucher informed me that his attitude was as follows: It was evident that the problem of the Jews in Germany had for many years been a serious one, as on account of their industry, intelligence and application they had been able in extraordinarily large numbers to make places for themselves in the government administrations, in the professions, in business and in banking. He said that probably because there was a prejudice against them, not only here but elsewhere, the Jews applied themselves to whatever they did with greater zeal and with a greater singleness of purpose than those who did not have such a prejudice to contend with, and with this zeal in addition to native intelligence they had succeeded in Germany in getting into a preponderant position in many activities of German life. He pointed out that in one hospital, for example, 84% of the physicians were Jews and that while this percentage was large the number of Jews in the professions was much higher than their relative percentage of the population...While in his opinion as a non-Jew he believes that Jews hold relatively too large a place in the government, business, professional and financial structure of the country, and while something could be done and should be done to bring about a better relative position [for non-Jews], he does not believe that this should be done in the way it is being attempted under the present government' 19 .
Despite some sympathy for Jewish achievements and considerable resentment of Nazi interference with his firm, Bucher lacked principled opposition to early Nazi Jewish policy. After an apparent conversation with Hitler on the subject, he went along with the creation of a party screening committee within the firm to review personnel appointments 20 . Messersmith concluded from this and other examples that members of the German elites would not oppose the regime on the Jewish question either they would express enthusiasm or they would bottle up their concerns. Perhaps they had little choice.
Both Messersmith and Geist focused on the attitudes of German youth. Although not fully "Nazified,ΓÇ¥ more and more youths became swept up in the enthusiasm for the regime and its goals and were highly susceptible to Nazi propaganda. Geist warned in June 1934: The younger hordes massed into the Hitler Youth, which flourish in every township and hamlet in the country, will make European history of the gravest importance, if not world history, if they continue under the present regime 21 .
A few months later Geist reported that German youth was being inculcated with a sense of militarism to an unprecedented degree 22 . In May 1933 Messersmith believed that the Nazi movement had aroused mass prejudices against Jews to such an extent, that even if official persecution ceased professional and private life for Jews would be difficult for years to come. Moreover, those opposed to antisemitic measures because of their consequences for the economy were, on balance, afraid to raise their voices 23 . A little more than a year later Geist warned against the conclusion that Germans as a whole shared the rabid antisemitism of the Nazis. He believed that the persecution of the Jews was purely the result of Nazi action. Although the public (in contrast to German youth), was tired of and disgusted by it, they were not much concerned with Jewish suffering.
Those who might gain something from it would continue to victimise Jews, and they could certainly appeal to authorities to get their way, but otherwise actions and direction came from above 24 .
Geist did not, however, give a positive appraisal of German attitudes generally. He saw the public as increasingly enthusiastic about Pan-German ideas and willing to follow Hitler wherever he might lead. (Geist noted that the most significant reservations were held by German workers, who already feared that the Nazi course would lead to war.) 25 During a 1935 visit to Germany Messersmith, too, got the impression that the combination of Hitler's successes and propaganda had unleashed dangerous sentiments:
'... there is a certain amount of popular hysteria in Germany. It is the psychology of a defeated nation which is frantically trying to get out of its inferiority complex. The Germans are a docile people, easily led, but now completely disorganised and disoriented with respect to practically every social and economic problem, and with respect to the outside world. It is not only the controlled press, but the daily diet of Nazi propaganda which is responsible for this' 26 .
He did not comment at all at this time on popular antisemitism.
In early 1937 Geist reinforced his claim that the German people were tired of hearing Nazi propaganda about the Jews. Shortly before Christmas booklet was printed in Breslau listing the names of all the shops owned and operated by Jews. Many of the inhabitants, however, used it as a shopping guide, and the Jewish merchants did a fine business. Geist even wrote explicitly that only Nazi laws and other actions could harm the Jews, not public sentiment. However, because of the structure of the regime and its commitment to antisemitism and anti-Bolshevism, there was and would be no improvement in the situation of the Jews. Moreover, the regime did not lack energetic followers who had faith in Germany's destiny under Hitler 27 .
Geist's reports in 1938 and 1939 tended to concentrate more on the refugee problem, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, and the approach of war than on German public opinion. There is little, however, to indicate that he changed his appraisal. The driving force behind antisemitism in Germany was clearly the Nazi regime; There was some quiet discontent with the constant flow of antisemitic propaganda but the German public did not object, neither did they regard the problem as pressing. On the other hand, German youth solidly supported antisemitism, and the regime had more than enough active supporters to implement its program. Hitler was determined to get hiway in any case.
On balance, Messersmith had a slightly more negative view of German prejudices toward Jews than did Geist, although Messersmith also believed that Nazi agitation had instilled many prejudices, not reinforced them. Since neither man had spent significant time in Germany before the Nazi movement became powerful, both of them tended to assume that the Nazis had originated much of the antisemitism. Nonetheless Messersmith and Geist certainly appreciated that a good number of German professionals and some businessmen had benefited from antisemitic measures, that Nazi propaganda had spread a demonic image of Jews to some of the lower socio-economic classes and the youth, and that even many "good GermansΓÇ¥ were willing to put up with this for the sake of Germany's increased strength.
Their reporting had significant limitations. Neither man travelled frequently throughout the country, so, although both received information from elsewhere, they probably exaggerated the conditions in Berlin and other major cities. Finally, in spite of Geist's occasional comments about German workers, both men most likely drew heavily on their personal acquaintances from the middle and upper classes, In short, if the SD reports and other official Nazi sources have characteristics that make them difficult to use, these American diplomatic reports and letters are an even cruder gauge of German public opinion. Still, they are not inconsistent with other sources.
In 1943 an analyst in the (American), Office of Strategic Services summarised two diametrically opposed theories about recent antisemitism in Germany. Socialist Paul Hagen had argued that antisemitism was purely a Nazi creation, and that many Germans had made gestures to Jews from 1933 onward to express their disagreement with the Nazi policy. German writer Emil Ludwig, however, had claimed that the German people were inherently and irretrievably antisemitic, and that Nazi antisemitism had a tremendous popular following. The Office of Strategic Services analyst suggested that the Nazis had initiated much, but that previous animosity toward Jews must have existed in some sectors of the population, especially the upper bourgeoisie and the free professions. The working class was not enthusiastic about antisemitism to start with and had benefited little from Nazi measures against Jews. Those who became disillusioned with Nazi antisemitism during the 1930s, however, were more than outweighed by the new generation which had been raised on a steady diet of antisemitic propaganda. It was the German youth that represented the largest base of support for antisemitism 28 .
Some rough conclusions are permissible from the American diplomatic/consular sources. There is no doubt that the Nazi take over and Nazi propaganda intensified prejudices against Jews and spread them to wider segments of the population. Second, two observers highly sensitive to the significance of Jewish policy for the Nazi regime did not see Nazi treatment of Jews either as a major reason for, or as an obstacle to, the increasing popularity of Hitler and the government. Finally, there is no indication whatsoever that either Messersmith or Geist observed or sensed popular antisemitism so intense that the Germans were ready and eager to murder Jews at the slightest sign of encouragement from above.
References:
1. David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution. Public Opinion Under Nazism , Oxford, 1992, pp. 4-9.
2. Jesse H. Stiller, George S. Messersmith. Diplomat of Democracy , Chapel Hill, 1987, pp. 29, 35.
3. Contemporary appraisals of Dodd's weakness are legion. See Moffat's comment "Dodd may know the situation in Germany but has no power to describe it or keep the Department fully informedΓÇ¥ in Wilbur Carr's Diary, 19 April 1935, Library of Congress. Geist's appraisal of Dodd's ineffectiveness can be found in Wilbur J. Carr's memorandum, 5 June 1935, Box 12, Carr Papers, Library of Congress. See the excellent article by Franklin L. Ford, "Three Observers in Berlin: Rumbold, Dodd and Francois-Poncet,ΓÇ¥ in: The Diplomat, 1919-1939 , Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds., Princeton, 1953, pp. 437-76. See also the assessment of Dodd by Robert Dallek, Democrat and Diplomat. The Life of William E. Dodd , New York, 1968, which is not convincing.
4. Messersmith to Secretary of State, 14 November 1938, Messersmith Papers, item 1075. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 , New York, 1979, pp. 167-68.
5. Stiller, Messersmith, pp. 28-29.
6. Ibid, pp. 1-5, 17.
7. In 1935 Messersmith described Geist as the most valuable officer the U.S. had in Berlin, and the Assistant Secretary of State Carr agreed. Carr Diary, 24 April 1936, Library of Congress. On Geist generally, Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933-1945 , Bloomington, 1987. Also, Stiller, Messersmith, pp. 27-28.
8. Because all of Messersmith's official dispatches and private letters are included in his papers, I have used and cited the Messersmith Papers below, rather than the National Archives. All the official reports, however, are also in the National Archives.
9. Stiller, Messersmith, p. 5.
10.Messersmith to Secretary of State, 24 August 1933, confidential, "Further Development of the Anti-Semitic movement in Germany,ΓÇ¥ and Messersmith to William Phillips, 29 September 1933, Messersmith Papers, items 270 and 312, University of Delaware.
11.Messersmith to William Phillips, 29 September 1933, Messersmith Papers, item 312. On Phillips, see Breitman and Kraut, American Refugee Policy, pp. 36-37.
12.Phillips to Messersmith, 14 October 1933, Additions to Collection, Messersmith Papers.
13.Messersmith to Secretary of State, 14 March 1933, 21 March 1933, 28 March 1933, 17 June 1933, items 118, 123, 128, 195.
14.Messersmith to Secretary of State, 17 June 1933, strictly confidential; Messersmith to Secretary of State, 1 November 1933, "Present Status of the Anti-Semitic Movement in Germany,ΓÇ¥ strictly confidential, Messersmith Papers, items 195 and 325.
15.William Phillips Diary, 22 December 1935; notes on conversation with Geist in Berlin, Phillips Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University. Breitman and Kraut, American Refugee Policy, p. 67.
16.Geist to Messersmith, 4 April 1939, Messersmith Papers, item 1187.
17.Messersmith to Secretary of State, 1 November 1933, "Present Status of the Anti-Semitic Movement in Germany,ΓÇ¥ strictly confidential, Messersmith Papers, item 325.
18.Messersmith to Secretary of State, 3 April 1933, strictly confidential, Messersmith Papers, item 133. William E. Beitz Memorandum Concerning Boycott of Jewish Stores in Berlin on 1 April 1933, Messersmith Papers, item 124.
19.See especially Messersmith to Secretary of State, 22 June 1933, strictly confidential, Messersmith Papers, item 199.
20.Messersmith to Secretary of State, 3 April 1933, Messersmith Papers, item 133.
21.Messersmith to Secretary of State, 22 June 1933, strictly confidential; Messersmith to Phillips, 28 October 1933; Messersmith Papers, item 186 and 324. Quote from Geist to Moffat, 9 June 1934, Messersmith Papers, item 376.
22.Geist to Moffat, 15 September 1934, Messersmith Papers, item 417.
23.Messersmith to Secretary of State, 23 May 1933, Messersmith Papers, item 186. Messersmith to Secretary of State, 1 November 1933, "Present Status of the Anti-Semitic Movement in Germany,ΓÇ¥ strictly confidential, Messersmith Papers, item 325.
24.Geist to Moffat, 9 June 1934, Messersmith Papers, item 376.
25.Geist to Moffat, 9 June 1934, 10 August 1934, and 15 September 1934, Messersmith Papers, item 376, 398 and 417.
26.Messersmith Memorandum on Trip to Germany, 21-25 March 1935, Messersmith Papers, item 495.
27.Geist to Messersmith, 11 January 1937, Messersmith Papers, item 817.
28.Current Status of Anti-Semitism in Germany [1943], National Archives, Record Group 200, Box 29, Folder 361.
